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Abstract: Mosquito vectors are extending their range via international travel and trade. Climate
change makes New Zealand an increasingly suitable environment for less tropically adapted exotic
mosquito vectors to become established. This shift will add a multiplier effect to existing risks of
both the establishment of new species and of resident exotic species extending into new areas. We
describe trends in the border interceptions of exotic mosquitoes and evaluate the role of imported
goods as a pathway for these introductions. Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus, the two most commonly
intercepted species, were only intercepted in Auckland. Used tyres and machinery were the main
mode of entry for both species. The majority of Ae. albopictus were transported as larvae by sea, while
most Ae. aegypti were transported as adults by air. Continuing introductions of these mosquitoes,
mainly arriving via Japan or Australia, increase the risk of the local transmission of mosquito-borne
diseases in New Zealand in general and in the Auckland region in particular. These findings reinforce
the need for a high performing and adequately resourced national biosecurity system, particularly
port surveillance and inspection. Recommended biosecurity improvements are described.
Keywords: mosquitoes; New Zealand; interception; Aedes albopictus; Aedes aegypti; used tyres;
machinery; climate change; vector-borne diseases
1. Introduction
The rate of introduction of exotic mosquito species in new geographic areas has increased notably
in parallel with global trade and travel [1–4]. The spread of the container-breeding species Aedes
albopictus and Aedes aegypti beyond their native range has been facilitated by the trade of goods,
significantly in used tyres and machinery [5–7]. These two species are a major public health concern,
as they are the main vectors of the most important arboviral diseases, including yellow fever, dengue,
chikungunya, and Zika [8]. Despite the widespread distribution of these arboviruses, the majority are
found in tropical and subtropical climate zones where Aedes mosquitos are prevalent [9].
Ae. albopictus is native to humid tropics of Southeast Asia. However, it has expanded geographically
during the last four decades [10,11] to mid-latitude temperate areas of all continents [12,13], making it
the most invasive mosquito species in the world [13]. The main factor contributing to the aggressive
colonizing capacity of Ae. albopictus seems to be its ability to adapt to different climates through
the production of diapausing cold-resistant eggs, with temperate strains surviving cold winters in
mid-latitudes [11,12].
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Ae. aegypti is distributed predominantly in the tropical regions of all continents, as well as some
subtropical regions, such as the south-eastern United States, northern Australia, and northern India [14].
Up to the beginning of the 20th century, this invasive species was established in temperate countries
in Europe, as far north as Belarus and Ukraine [15]. It has recently re-established itself on the island
of Madeira (south-west of Portugal) [16], around the Black Sea [17], and in Netherlands [18]. Unlike
Ae. albopictus, Ae. aegypti does not overwinter in the egg stage. Instead, the active stages minimize
exposure to unsuitable environmental conditions by utilizing sheltered sites in urban settings (e.g.,
water tanks) [19]. Reiter [15], however, claims that there are no climatic reasons why Ae. aegypti could
not become widely established in other temperate regions, if introduced or reintroduced.
The transport of immature stages of Aedes species via the used tyre trade appears to account for
the establishment of Ae. japonicus in France [20] and the United States [2,21]; Ae. albopictus in Albania,
France, and Italy in Europe [12,22]; the United States, 10 other countries in the Americas [23]; and
elsewhere [2,21,24]. The establishment of Ae. albopictus in the United States for the first time in 1985
followed a substantial increase in used tyre imports shipped from Japan after 1980. Subsequently,
Ae. albopictus was recorded in 26 states [25]. By the late 1990s, the United States Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) stopped tyre inspections because Ae. albopictus had already invaded
most of the country [26]. Used tyre transportation may not have played such a major role in recent
invasions of Ae. aegypti [2]. However, used tyre shipments [12,22] from the United States were the
major source of Ae. aegypti mosquitoes transported to South America [27] and the Netherlands [28].
There are also concerns over the introduction and establishment of exotic mosquito vectors
by aircraft into countries where they are not indigenous [1]. Aircraft were probably responsible
for the introduction of the Ae. aegypti into Trinidad and Tobago [29], Bermuda [30], Bolivia, and
Colombia [1]. Further, dengue and Ross River Virus (RRV) infection outbreaks followed the introduction
of Ae. albopictus by aircraft into the Solomon Islands [1], Ae. vigilax into Fiji [31], and most of the Western
Pacific region [1,31].
The establishment of mosquitoes depends on suitable ecological conditions. Despite the
predominantly temperate climate (subarctic in the north and subtropical in the south) [32], Ae. albopictus
is widespread in Japan, with northward expansion (to latitude 38 degrees north; annual mean
temperature of 11 ◦C) [33]. For the first time since World War II, Tokyo recorded an outbreak of
dengue in early autumn 2014 [34]. Dengue epidemics in Japan are likely to increase over the next
decades, facilitated by the continuing geographic expansion of Ae. albopictus and favorable climatic
conditions [35]. Increasing temperature has been also implicated as a major factor in the establishment
and re-establishment of Aedes species and their associated diseases in Europe [4,34].
Global climate change is projected to have a marked effect on larval development, female feeding
behaviour, arbovirus replication, and transmission [36–39]. Global climate models project a rise
in mean temperatures of 1.5 ◦C by sometime between 2030 and 2052 [40]. This change would
create new ecological niches for mosquito vectors, altering the global spatio-temporal distribution of
mosquito-borne diseases [41,42]. Consideration of adaptability and dispersal ability, combined with
climate change projections and current risk mapping, suggest that new introductions and establishment
of at least one of the two Aedes species are very likely to occur in new geographic areas [10,11] including
those countries with rigorous biosecurity systems, such as France, Australia, and New Zealand [43].
New Zealand has only 12 documented native mosquito species, despite its temperate climate and
suitable environments for mosquitoes to establish [44,45]. New Zealand’s peculiar indigenous fauna
(notably a lack of land mammals as hosts), high level of anthropogenic environmental change [39],
and increasing global trade (mainly shipping) and tourism make it vulnerable to invasion by exotic
mosquitoes. All three resident mosquito species that are known vectors of human disease have been
introduced: Ae. notoscriptus, Ae. Australis, and Culex quinquefasciatus [45]. Their establishment may
serve as a blueprint for the establishment of other exotic mosquitoes in New Zealand, especially
Ae. albopictus [46,47]. Laird et al. [46] first alerted authorities that used tyres were a source of imports
and potential infestation by known vector species. He reported about a hundred Ae. albopictus larvae
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in a used tyre shipment from Japan. Derraik [48] found in 2006 that used tyres and machinery
comprised about 75% of all mosquito interceptions arriving by ships in New Zealand. According to
Kramer et al. [39], at least two endemic species (Cx. pervigilans and Ae. antipodeus) are also potential
arbovirus vectors.
In this study, we describe trends in the border interceptions of exotic mosquitoes and evaluate the
role of used tyre and vehicle imports as a means of transport. We update and expand on the review of
Derraik [48] on mosquitoes intercepted in New Zealand to 2004. The study objectives are:
1. To examine New Zealand exotic mosquito interception data, pathways, and ports of entry for the
period from July 2001 to March 2018.
2. To examine New Zealand import data for potential water receptacles (used tyres and used
machinery) in the same period of time.
3. To evaluate the role of used tyres and vehicles imports as a contributor to exotic mosquito
introductions, especially for the container-breeding species, Ae. albopictus and Ae. aegypti.
4. To examine interceptions of new vector mosquitoes as a risk factor for local transmission of
arbovirus disease in New Zealand, and to consider implications of identified trends for present
and projected climate conditions and for biosecurity practices.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. The Interception Records
Mosquito interception data were provided by the New Zealand Ministry of Health from records
obtained between June 2001 and March 2018. The data were categorised according to mosquito species,
country of origin, mode of entry, port of entry, and date of interception. The New Zealand Ministry
of Health [49] defines an interception event as the confirmation that adult mosquitoes or larvae of
public health significance are detected at or before the New Zealand border, or in association with
recently arrived travellers or goods. Considering the impact of current biosecurity import practices
on preventing the arrival of mosquitoes from overseas, we have adopted an even wider definition.
We considered an interception event to be the detection of any mosquito, dead or alive, of foreign or
unknown country of origin, irrespective of whether the species is already present in New Zealand
(established). If more than one mosquito species were intercepted at the same time, each species
(regardless of numbers of specimens) was considered as a separate interception event. Vessels, mainly
ships, stop at one or more ports prior to arriving in New Zealand. This makes it difficult to confirm
the origin of an invading species. We followed Derraik [48] in assigning origin to the last overseas
port of call but appreciate that this does include an element of uncertainty. According to the Ministry
of Health [50], the exotic mosquitoes listed on the “Unwanted Organisms Register” in New Zealand
include all mosquitoes of the genus Anopheles plus 13 other species.
According to New Zealand BioSecure [45], there are three lines of defence to prevent the
establishment of exotic mosquitoes in New Zealand. These lines are: (i) pre-border clearance of
risk goods conducted by Ministry for Primary Industries Quarantine Service staff at offshore sites;
(ii) inspection and disinsection, undertaken by public health units and port companies, of ships (first
port of international call vessels), aircraft, and their high-risk cargo arriving at New Zealand ports;
and (iii) mosquito surveillance at seaports and airports conducted by Public Health Units and the
Ministry of Health, including handovers from Ministry for Primary Industries, from customs, or
transitional facilities.
The surveillance consists of routine monitoring surveys including adult (CO2 baited light traps)
and larvae (World Health Organization standard tyre traps) trapping, larval surveys (World Health
Organization standard dipping method) and interception responses. Most of the interception data
were obtained from activities of the inspection and disinsection of ships and shipment.
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2.2. Interception Sites: Airports, Seaports, and Their Transitional Facilities
Data were examined from seven airports, six seaports, and their transitional facilities (Figure 1).
These are the major commercial ports of entry to New Zealand out of a total of 35 air and seaports where
biosecurity surveillance is undertaken. The transitional facilities are approved to receive containers
and goods that pose a potential biosecurity risk, especially plants, animals, and related products. At
these facilities, the goods or containers are inspected or treated before they can be cleared for entry
into the country [45]. There are about 7000 transitional facilities throughout New Zealand [51]. The
entrance pathways of mosquitoes intercepted in transitional facilities were assigned to the nearest port
and the means of invasion (e.g., fruit containers, used tyres, and used machinery) in relation to its
origin of transport.
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Figure 1. Ports of entry of mosquito interceptions in ew Zealand, July 2001–March 2018.
2.3. Trade Data Imports and International Flights
Data on air and sea freight imports (including used tyres and vehicles), and international passenger
flight arrivals to New Zealand (2001 to 2017), were obtained from Statistics New Zealand. Used vehicles
included motor cars, heavy vehicles, and all special purpose vehicles or transporters. Interception
data were examined in relation to date, origin, and size of trade imports to assess the risk of exotic
mosquitoes arriving in New Zealand and their pathways of entry.
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2.4. Statistical Analysis
Confidence intervals for the proportions of interception records were estimated using the
Clopper-Pearson exact method. The seasonality for Ae. aegypti and for Ae. albopictus interception
records were estimated using the Poisson regression model of Stolwijk et al. [52]. Time trends in
interception counts were modelled with negative binomial regression with overdispersion using the
Genmod procedure in the statistical package SAS 9.4 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA). For all
mosquito interception counts, a model with the year was used. For Ae. albopictus and Ae. aegypti,
differences in time trends were tested with a model with the year, species, and species by year
interaction terms.
3. Results
3.1. The Interception Records
Interception events: District Health Board officers and New Zealand BioSecure responded to
over 650 suspected interceptions in the assessment period (Figure 2). Of these, 244 were considered
interception events and used in the analysis. About 90% of these events had an identified foreign
country of origin. However, more than 13.5% of the suspected interceptions were flies other than
mosquitoes (mainly Chironomids). Of the 44 mosquito species intercepted, 18 were on the “Unwanted
Organisms Register” (Table 1). These made up 75% of exotic interceptions. Ae. aegypti was the
most commonly intercepted of the registered species, with more than 32% of the total, followed by
Ae. albopictus, (22%). The number of Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus interceptions is likely to be higher,
since 49 out of 244 records were taxonomically unidentifiable or identified to genus level only (Figure 2).
The established species (Ae. camptorhynchus, Cx. quinquefasciatus and Ae. notoscriptus) of presumed
foreign origin were intercepted 56 times. Although Ae. camptorhynchus was declared to be eradicated
from New Zealand in June 2010, it remains a high-risk species on the register [53].
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Table 1. Species and development stages of mosquito interception events in New Zealand, July
2001–March 2018. * On Ministry of Health “Unwanted Organisms Register”.
Species No. of Events (Larvae)
Culex 107 (14)
Cx. quinquefasciatus 60 (11)
Cx. sitiens * 8 (1)
Cx. australicus 6 (0)
Cx. pervigilans 5 (0)
Cx. pipiens * 2 (0)
Cx. gelidus * 2 (0)
Cx. nigripalpus 1 (0)
Cx. annulirostris * 1(0)
Cx. ocossa 1 (0)
Cx. tritaeniorhynchus 1 (0)
Cx. fuscocephala 1 (0)
Cx. sp. 19 (2)
Aedes 108 (47)
Ae aegypti * 29 (11)
Ae. albopictus * 20 (15)
Ae. notoscriptus 14 (6)
Ae. vexans 8 (0)
Ae. camptorhynchus * 6 (3)
Ae. japonicus * 6 (4)
Ae. vigilax * 6 (1)
Ae. taeniorhynchus 3 (0)
Ae. polynesiensis * 2 (2)
Ae. vittiger 2 (0)
Ae. alternans 2 (0)
Ae. tremulus 1 (1)
Ae. cinereus 1 (0)
Ae. infirmatus 1 (0)
Ae. sollicitans 1 (0)
Ae. cooki 1 (1)
Ae. togoi * 1 (1)
Ae. sierrensis * 1 (1)
Ae. sp. 3 (1)
Anopheles 6 (1)
A. siniensis * 1 (0)
A. subpictus * 1 (0)
A. stephensi * 1 (0)
A. crucians * 1 (0)
A. culicifacies * 1 (1)
A. albimanus * 1 (0)
Other 9 (3)
Mansonia humeralis 1 (0)
Culiseta annulata 1 (0)
Coquillettidia nigricans 1 (0)
Uranotaenia sp. 1 (0)
Verralina funerea 1 (0)
Mansonia titillans 1 (0)
Toxorhynchites speciosus 1 (1)
Tripteroides bambusa 1 (1)
Uranotaenia novobscura 1 (1)
Mosquito spp. 14 (1)
Total 244 (66)
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Origin of interception: Twenty-eight interceptions were of unknown origin (Figure 2). The
balance of 179 interceptions came from 33 different countries (Table 2), of which Asia-Pacific countries
were the major contributors, with more than 75% of the reported interceptions. Predictably, Australia,
as the closest to New Zealand and the main destination and source for tourists and trade, appears
to be, by far, the most common source of interceptions, accounting for 25% of the total interceptions
of known origin. Since Cx. pervigilans is endemic, it is likely that specimens intercepted are from a
local source. Japan was the second source of interceptions of a known origin, with 11.7%, followed by
Ecuador, the major source of fruit imports (mainly bananas) to New Zealand.
Table 2. Countries of origin and development stages of mosquito interception events in New Zealand,
July 2001–March 2018.
Origin of Transport No. Events (Larvae) % by Total
South Pacific 95 (29) 38.9
Australia 48 (9) 19.7
Fiji 12 (0) 4.9
Vanuatu 7 (6) 2.9
Samoa 6 (4) 2.5
New Caledonia 6 (0) 2.5
Cook Islands 5 (5) 2.0
Tonga 5 (0) 2.0
Wallis and Futuna 2 (2) 0.8
Niue 1 (1) 0.4
Papua New Guinea 1 (1) 0.4
Guam 1 (0) 0.4
Noumea 1 (0) 0.4
Asia 52 (19) 21.3
Japan 23 (15) 9.4
India 4 (1) 1.6
Philippines 4 (0) 1.6
China 4 (0) 1.6
Thailand 3 (0) 1.2
Hong Kong 3 (0) 1.2
Malaysia 2 (1) 0.8
Korea 2 (1) 0.8
Taiwan 2 (0) 0.8
Vietnam 2 (0) 0.8
Singapore 2 (1) 0.8
Cambodia 1 (0) 0.4
Americas 46 (4) 18.9
Ecuador 21 (0) 8.6
USA 17 (4) 7.0
Chile 3 (0) 1.2
Canada 2 (0) 0.8
Panama 1 (0) 0.4
Argentina 1 (0) 0.4
Colombia 1 (0) 0.4
Europe 4 (0) 1.6
Netherlands 2 (0) 0.8
Germany 2 (0) 0.8
Unknown 47 (15) 19.3
Total 244 (66) 100
Entrance pathway: The major pathway of entrance for mosquito interceptions to date has been by
sea. More than 66% of known interceptions were at six New Zealand seaports (Table 3). Of these, 83%
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were at Ports of Auckland. The remaining 34% were in seven airports. Auckland International Airport
was by far the main entry point, accounting for more than 81% of air pathway interceptions. Auckland
was the main city of entry, with 201 records (134 Ports of Auckland and 67 Auckland International
Airport), accounting for more than 82.5% of all interceptions (Table 3).
Table 3. Entrance pathway and development stages of mosquito interception events in New Zealand,
July 2001–March 2018.
Pathway Port No. of Events(Larvae)
% by Entrance
Pathway % by Total
By sea
Ports of Auckland 134 (52) 83.2 54.9
Lyttelton Port 11 (5) 6.8 4.5
CentrePort Wellington 7 (1) 4.4 2.9
Port of Tauranga 7 (0) 4.4 2.9
Port of Whangarei 1 (0) 0.6 0.4
Port Otago 1 (0) 0.6 0.4
Total interceptions by sea 161 (58) 100 66
By air
Auckland International Airport 67 (6) 80.7 27.5
Christchurch International Airport 9 (0) 10.8 4.4
Wellington Airport 3 (0) 3.6 1.2
Tauranga Airport 1 (0) 1.2 0.4
Hamilton Airport 1 (1) 1.2 0.4
Hastings airport 1 (0) 1.2 0.4
Marlborough Airport 1 (1) 1.2 0.4
Total interceptions by air 83 (8) 100 34
Total interceptions 244 (66) 100 100
Stages of development: About 73% of the mosquito interceptions were recorded as adults
(Table 4). The major pathway for both adults and larvae has been by sea, 58% and 88%, respectively
(Table 4). Ae. aegypti, Ae. Albopictus, and Cx. quinquefasciatus made up 56% of the intercepted larvae
(Table 1). Most larvae (48/66) originated from the South Pacific (29/66) and Asia (19/66) (Table 2).
Used tyres and machinery accounted for about 60% of all larval interceptions and about 91% of larval
interceptions with known modes of transport (Table 5).
Table 4. Development stages and pathways of mosquito interception events in New Zealand, July
2001–March 2018.
Stage Entrance Pathway No. of Events % by Stage % by Total
Adult
By air 75 42 31
By sea 103 58 42
Total adult interceptions 178 100 73
Larvae
By air 8 12 3
By sea 58 88 24
Total larvae interceptions 66 100 27
Total interceptions 244 100 100
Means of transport: This was unknown in 99 cases (≈41%) (Table 5). These were intercepted
at seaports, airports, and their transitional facilities during mosquito port inspection and associated
surveillance. Mosquitoes entered by ship in fresh fruit and vegetable containers (30/244), used
machinery (29/244), and used tyres (25/244). Mosquitoes entered by airfreight in fruit and vegetable
containers, personal luggage, and unspecified good containers, collectively accounting for 11% (27/244)
of the cases.
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Table 5. Mosquito interception events in New Zealand, July 2001–March 2018.
Pathway Mean of Invasion No. Events (Larvae) % by Pathway % by Total
By air
Air Containers
Roses, fresh fruits, and vegetables 11 (0) 13.3 4.5
Unspecified 9 (0) 10.8 3.7
Luggage 7 (1) 8.4 2.9
Unknown
Inspection at and around
ports/transitional facilities 35 (1) 42.2 14.3
Aircrafts inspection 14 (2) 16.9 5.7
Surveillance traps 7 (4) 8.4 2.9
Total interceptions by air 83 (8) 100 34
By sea
Used tyres 25 (19) 15.5 10.2
Used machinery 29 (20) 18 11.9
Containers
Fresh fruits and vegetables 30 (1) 18.6 12.3
Manufactured goods 9 (0) 5.6 3.7
Empty 5 (0) 3.1 2
Unspecified 20 (2) 12.4 8.2
Unknown
Ports/ transitional facilities
inspection 14 (3) 8.7 5.7
On ships- inspection 25 (12) 15.5 10.2
Surveillance traps 4 (1) 2.5 1.6
Total interceptions by sea 161 (58) 100 66
Total interceptions 244 (66) 100 100
Years of interception: Between 2001 and 2015, the records of mosquito interceptions in New
Zealand varied between 6 and 21 records per year. However, an increase to 30 and 36 interceptions
was recorded in 2016 and 2017, respectively (Figure 3). Overall, there was a significant mean annual
increase of 7% (mean estimate 1.07, CI 1.03–1.12; p = 0.0009).
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Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus: To date, Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus were only intercepted
in Auckland. Most Ae. aegypti were intercepted as adults arriving by aircraft. In contrast, most
Ae. albopictus entered the country as larvae by sea (Table 6). Ae. aegypti was intercepted 19 times at
Auckland International Airport and 10 times at Ports of Auckland, while Ae. albopictus was intercepted
19 times at Ports of Auckland and only once at Auckland International Airport. Most Ae. albopictus
arrived in used machinery (40%) and used tyres (20%).
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Table 6. Origin of Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus intercepted in New Zealand, July 2001–March 2018.
Species (No.) Location ofInterception (No.) Stage (No.) Mode of Entry (No.) Origin of Transport (No.)
Ae. aegypti (29)
Auckland
International
Airport (19)
Adult (15)
Larvae (4)
Unknown (17), Fruit
container (1), Luggage (1)
Unknown (12), USA (1),
New Caledonia (1), Japan
(1), Australia (1),
Philippines (1), Fiji (1),
Cambodia (1)
Ports of Auckland (10) Adult (3)Larvae (7)
Used machinery (4), Used
tyres (2), Unknown (2),
Empty Container (1),
Unspecified good
container (1)
Unknown (3), Cook
Islands (2), Tonga (1),
Samoa (1), Papua New
Guinea (1), Vanuatu (1),
Futuna (1)
Ae. albopictus (20)
Auckland International
Airport (1) Adult (1) Luggage (1) Taiwan (1)
Ports of Auckland (17)
and their transitional
facility (2)
Adult (4)
Larvae (15)
Used machinery (8), Used
tyres (4), Unknown (6),
Unspecified good
Container (1)
Japan (8), Vanuatu (3),
USA (2), Unknown (2),
Cook Islands (1), Malaysia
(1), Korea (1), Vietnam (1)
Ae. aegypti arrived mainly in used tyres and machinery (60%) (Table 6). While the country of origin
of more than half of the Ae. aegypti intercepted was unknown (51.7%), Japan was the most common
source of Ae. albopictus (40%) (Table 6).
For Ae. Aegypti, an annual increase of 20% (mean estimate 1.20, CI 1.08–1.34) was significant
(p = 0.0009) and for Ae. Albopictus, there was no significant change (mean estimate 0.93, CI 0.84–1.03;
p = 0.15). We note that there was considerable yearly variation and the main increase in Ae. aegypti
occurred over the last four years (Figure 3). The monthly interception records of both species peaked
in summer between December and February (Figure 4). This indicates a significant seasonality for
Ae. aegypti (p = 0.003) and for Ae. albopictus (p = 0.047).
Since exotic mosquitoes in general, and Ae. albopictus and Ae. aegypti in particular, mainly arrived
in used tyres and machinery, we also examined trends in import data for used tyres and machinery to
compare with the interception data.Trop. Med. Infect. Dis. 2019, 3, x FOR PEER REVIEW  11 of 18 
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3.2. Trade Data Imports and International Flights
Sea and air freight: Between 2001 and 2017, the total gross weight of New Zealand’s sea and air
freight imports increased by 60% (Supplementary S1) and 14% (Supplementary S2a), respectively.
International passenger flight arrivals: The total number of international flights to New Zealand
during the period of the study increased by more than 71% (from 22,180 to 38,027) (Supplementary S2a).
The most frequent international flights to New Zealand during the study period were from Sydney
(146,082), Melbourne (78,497), and Brisbane (75,322). There was a ten-fold increase in the number of
flights from Coolangatta airport (a tourist destination, Queensland Gold Coast) over the 17 year period.
This makes Coolangatta the fourth highest source of international flights to New Zealand from airports
where Ae. aegypti was established (after Brisbane, Los Angeles and Nadi) (Supplementary S2b).
Used tyres: From 2001–2017, New Zealand imported about 5.5 million used tyres from 35
countries (Supplementary S3). About five million (≈91%) were from 21 countries where Ae. albopictus
is established, and only about 300,000 (≈5%) were from 16 countries with Ae. aegypti. Japan, where
Ae. albopictus is indigenous, supplied about 88% of the total number of used tyres. Although the total
gross weight of New Zealand’s sea imports increased by more than 60% (Supplementary S1), there
was an 86% decline in the quantity of imported used tyres from its peak in 2003 (from around 607,000
to 85,000). During 2001–2003, New Zealand’s annual used tyre imports averaged more than a half of a
million. However, in 2017, this number significantly declined to about 85,000 (Supplementary S1) [45].
Used vehicles: In the past 17 years, New Zealand has imported a total of about 2.3 million used
vehicles from 107 countries. Japan was by far the largest source, with more than 1.95 million used
vehicles, representing about 88% of the total vehicle imports (Supplementary S3). New Zealand
imported around 133,000 used vehicles per year from 2001 to 2017. However, concurrently with the
global financial crisis, the average number of vehicle imports dropped to approximately 70,000 vehicles
per year between 2007 and 2012 (Supplementary S1).
4. Discussion
4.1. Main Findings
Our findings add to earlier observations that Aedes mosquito vectors, especially Ae. albopictus, have
extended their range via international travel and trade, especially via used tyres and machinery [5–7].
To date, Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus have been the two most commonly intercepted foreign vector
mosquitoes. The Ports of Auckland and Auckland Airport were the main ports of arrival into New
Zealand and the only points of entry for both Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus. Most of the interceptions
probably originated from Japan or arrived via Australia. Japan, where Ae. albopictus is indigenous, was
by far New Zealand’s largest supplier of both used tyres and vehicles and was also the largest source
of Ae. albopictus.
The majority of Ae. albopictus were transported as larvae via shipping vessels, but the majority of
Ae. aegypti were transported by air as adults. The latter is consistent with the increasing number of
international flights to New Zealand from Ae. aegypti endemic areas, notably Queensland. Most of the
exotic interceptions arrived by sea in used machinery and tyres.
Most Ae. albopictus interceptions have been larvae, imported by sea, and most likely originating
from Japan. The majority of Ae. aegypti have been intercepted as adults transported by air, potentially
from neighbouring countries with direct and frequent flights to New Zealand. These findings are
consistent with the biological features of Ae. aegypti and Ae. Albopictus, whose eggs are deposited in
natural and artificial habitats where water levels fluctuate [54]. These eggs are stimulated to hatch
by rising water levels, often many months later [21]. Larvae of many container-breeding mosquitoes
are also able to survive food scarcity for several weeks, or even months, longer than any immature
stages of other mosquito species (e.g., ground water mosquitoes) [55]. With suboptimal food, larvae of
Ae. albopictus can survive between 58 and 80 days [56]. However, with enough food, they may develop
to adults within two weeks. Another physiological adaptation of Ae. albopictus larvae that facilitates
Trop. Med. Infect. Dis. 2019, 4, 101 12 of 18
their survival in tyres is their superior tolerance to contaminants in tyre leachate compared with other
mosquito species [57]. Furthermore, Ae. albopictus eggs are thermal and desiccation tolerant and may
remain viable for several months [58].
Sailing time from Japan to Auckland, which is New Zealand’s main gateway for international
trade and the main city of entry for foreign mosquitoes, is between 10–12.5 days [59]. The journey
time is between 12–17 days from Munich [60], 15 days from San Francisco and three days from
Australia [59,61]. Therefore, Ae. albopictus can survive a journey from Japan, Germany, or USA to New
Zealand in larval and egg stages, possibly under extreme weather and food shortage conditions. The
adults, however, cannot survive starvation for more than seven days [62]. It is, therefore, possible for a
female mosquito locked in a vehicle to survive a journey from Australia, but this is unlikely to occur
from more distant countries like the USA, Germany, and Japan [61].
It is clear that both Aedes species can travel to New Zealand via shipping and airplanes. However,
the number of interceptions is relatively small (29 Ae. aegypti and 20 Ae. albopictus in 17 years). On the
other hand, there were 39 detections of Ae. aegypti at Perth International Airport, Australia alone in a
six month period (October 2015–April 2016) [63]. In the year ending June 2018, more than 10 million
international passengers passed though Auckland Airport [64]. In the same period, about 4.4 million
international passengers travelled through Perth International Airport [65]. Both airports receive
frequent direct flights from Ae. aegypti endemic countries, such as Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and
many Pacific Islands [64,65]. This comparison provides some support for the effectiveness of current
New Zealand pre-border biosecurity measures to reduce mosquito introductions and prevent their
establishment (Supplementary S4).
4.2. Current Risk Status for Arboviral Infections
The New Zealand population is considered to have the highest per capita rate of international
travel in the world, especially within the Asia Pacific region [66,67], where epidemics of arboviral
disease are an ongoing feature. Imported cases of arboviral infections are reported every year among
travellers to New Zealand arriving from endemic or epidemic regions, mainly Pacific Islands and
Australia [68]. Travel and trade conditions, combined with the presence of exotic mosquito vectors and
global climate change, increase the risk of the local transmission of mosquito-borne diseases in New
Zealand [66]. A warmer climate will also facilitate latitudinal and altitudinal range expansion [38,42,69].
This situation is compounded by the recent unaccredited cruise ships that have arrived on New Zealand
shores without being checked by the Ministry for Primary Industries [70]. This concern is exemplified
by the finding of Cx sitiens larvae by Biosecurity NZ near the Kaipara in March 2018 [71]. Cx. sitiens
is widespread in the Pacific, Australia and Southeast Asia and is a competent vector for several
arboviruses, such as RRV [72].
Furthermore, according to a recent study carried out in Australia, intercepted Ae. aegypti mosquitoes
detected at international ports in New Zealand and Australia had point mutations that confer strong
resistance to synthetic pyrethroids, the only insecticide class used for aircraft disinsection validated by
the World Health Organization [63].
4.3. Climatic Suitability for Aedes Mosquitos’ Establishment in New Zealand
Establishment and dispersal of exotic mosquitoes after introduction is only possible under suitable
climatic conditions [34]. According to de Wet et al. [69], and under the current temperature and rainfall
conditions, Auckland and the Northland regions are the most suitable areas in New Zealand for the
establishment of Ae. albopictus [73]. However, projected increases in temperature, rainfall, and humidity
could make these areas suitable for Ae. aegypti and extend the geographic distribution of Ae. albopictus
to the south [69,73].
Summer 2017–2018 was New Zealand’s hottest summer on record across all regions, with
average temperature of 18.8 ◦C, (2.1 ◦C above the 1981–2010 average). Auckland recorded the highest
temperatures in the country [74]. Using a mid-range climate projection, Pearce et al. [75] reported that
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Auckland’s temperature is expected to increase by 0.5 to 4.2 ◦C by 2040–2110, depending on future
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere [75].
Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus, the most commonly intercepted “unwanted” species, were only
intercepted in Auckland. Moreover, the majority of used tyres and machinery enters New Zealand
at the Ports of Auckland. Arriving exotic mosquitoes in general, and Ae. albopictus in particular, are
likely to find a suitable habitat around the ports of entry, while climate warming will facilitate their
establishment and spread [76]. This local situation illustrates a global concern and one of the future
human costs of globalising travel and trade.
4.4. Implications and Recommendations
The first line of defence against climatic influences on the establishment and spread of arbovirus
diseases should be to prevent the entry of exotic mosquito vectors. This approach is likely to be far
more cost-effective than attempting to contain and eradicate exotic mosquitoes after their establishment
in New Zealand. We recommend a particular focus on biosecurity practices as follows:
1. Regularly review mosquito interception practices as part of an integrated vector-borne disease
surveillance system. Consider a surveillance sector approach [77] and advice from targeted
research –based surveillance to identify potential improvements. Such surveillance will be
essential to anticipate projected climatic influences
2. As a component of regular reviews of mosquito surveillance and interception responses, there
should be particular attention given to mosquito surveillance at major ports of entry, notably
at the Ports of Auckland and Auckland Airport. As we recognise that interception data are, at
least partially, relative to effort, this review should include improved standardisation of port
surveillance procedures, recording, and schedules (e.g., install permanent traps and yearlong
rather than seasonal operation) to provide a reliable baseline for future evaluation. This was a
key limitation in the quality of data available for this present analysis and review.
3. Increase the use of molecular methods to enhance mosquito interception surveillance. Effective
biosecurity surveillance of mosquitoes will depend on having a high level of confidence in
identifying mosquito species and origins. For example, only a third of interceptions linked
to aircraft have a specified port of origin. Molecular identification (e.g., [78,79]) of unknown
specimens and genetic origin analysis for unknown sources (e.g., [80]) are currently undertaken
by an Australian laboratory [63]. It is essential to facilitate direct access to New Zealand and
international molecular expertise and global reference material for this purpose.
4. In addition to existing biosecurity practices, new regulations and requirements should be adopted
for the discarding of waste tyres where they are within the 1600 meter-zone around ports (the
dispersal distance of Aedes mosquitoes [81]).
5. Review aircraft disinsection procedures for New Zealand. This review should pay particular
attention to Auckland Airport and the recent increase in interceptions of Ae. aegypti [82] in view
of the resistance to the pyrethroid pesticides [63] identified in specimens intercepted at New
Zealand and Australian ports [63].
6. Use research-based surveillance to regularly evaluate effectiveness and identify any specific gaps
with regard to current biosecurity measures.
5. Conclusions
Continuing introductions of Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus, and their potential establishment, raise
concerns about the initiation of locally transmitted mosquito-borne diseases in New Zealand in general
and in the Auckland region in particular. In 1998, when Italy and Albania were the only European
countries colonized by Ae. albopictus, Reiter [23] stated that “there is no reason to believe that the
European countries will be more successful than the United States in blocking the importation of
cargos infested with Ae. albopictus. In short, it seems we must accept the establishment of exotic species
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as an inevitable consequence of modern transportation technology”. Ae. albopictus has now been
reported in at least 27 countries in Europe. This expansion was facilitated by human activities, in
particular the trade of used tyres [22]. If New Zealand can learn any lesson from this experience with
invasive mosquitoes, it is that there should be no complacency. Continued vigilance and investment
in port surveillance are well justified by existing concerns, while future risks will be exacerbated by
climatic factors.
Supplementary Materials: They are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/2414-6366/4/3/101/s1.
Author Contributions: S.E.A., M.M., T.S., J.K., J.G.B.D., M.G.B. and S.H. provided comment and contributed
to manuscript revisions. J.K. also advised on biosecurity matters, M.G.B. and S.H. advised on public health
perspectives, J.G.B.D. provided extensive written comment, M.M. suggested the topic, supervised preparation of
the manuscript, and provided extensive written comment; S.E.A. conceived, designed and performed the analysis,
and prepared the original manuscript.
Funding: This research was supported by a University of Otago PhD scholarship for S.E.A.
Acknowledgments: We thank Gordon Purdie, University of Otago Wellington, for his valuable advice in the
statistical analysis. We also thank Mariana Musicante and New Zealand BioSecure for providing mosquito
interception data.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Gratz, N.G.; Steffen, R.; Cocksedge, W. Why aircraft disinsection? Bull. World Health Organ. 2000, 78,
995–1004. [PubMed]
2. Lounibos, L.P. Invasions by insect vectors of human disease. Annu. Rev. Entomol. 2002, 47, 233–266.
[CrossRef] [PubMed]
3. Tatem, A.J.; Rogers, D.J.; Hay, S. Global transport networks and infectious disease spread. Adv. Parasitol.
2006, 62, 293–343. [PubMed]
4. Semenza, J.C.; Suk, J.E. Vector-borne diseases and climate change: A European perspective. FEMS Microbiol.
Lett. 2017, 365, fnx244. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
5. Enserink, M. A mosquito goes global. Science 2008, 320, 864–866. [CrossRef]
6. Scholte, E.-J.; Schaffner, F. Waiting for the tiger: Establishment and spread of the Aedes albopictus mosquito in
Europe. In Emerging Pests and Vector-Borne Diseases in Europe; Chapter 14; Wageningen Academic Publishers:
Wageningen, The Netherlands, 2007; Volume 1, p. 241.
7. DeHart, R.L. Health issues of air travel. Annu. Rev. Public Health 2003, 24, 133–151. [CrossRef]
8. Leta, S.; Beyene, T.J.; De Clercq, E.M.; Amenu, K.; Kraemer, M.U.; Revie, C.W. Global risk mapping for major
diseases transmitted by Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus. Int. J. Infect. Dis. 2018, 67, 25–35. [CrossRef]
9. Gubler, D.J. The global emergence/resurgence of arboviral diseases as public health problems. Arch. Med.
Res. 2002, 33, 330–342. [CrossRef]
10. Benedict, M.Q.; Levine, R.S.; Hawley, W.A.; Lounibos, L.P. Spread of the tiger: Global risk of invasion by the
mosquito Aedes albopictus. Vector Borne Zoonotic Dis. 2007, 7, 76–85. [CrossRef]
11. Paupy, C.; Delatte, H.; Bagny, L.; Corbel, V.; Fontenille, D. Aedes albopictus, an arbovirus vector: From the
darkness to the light. Microbes Infect. 2009, 11, 1177–1185. [CrossRef]
12. Medlock, J.M.; Hansford, K.M.; Schaffner, F.; Versteirt, V.; Hendrickx, G.; Zeller, H.; Bortel, W.V. A review of
the invasive mosquitoes in Europe: Ecology, public health risks, and control options. Vector Borne Zoonotic
Dis. 2012, 12, 435–447. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
13. Bonizzoni, M.; Gasperi, G.; Chen, X.; James, A.A. The invasive mosquito species Aedes albopictus: Current
knowledge and future perspectives. Trends Parasitol. 2013, 29, 460–468. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
14. Soumahoro, M.-K.; Fontenille, D.; Turbelin, C.; Pelat, C.; Boyd, A.; Flahault, A.; Hanslik, T. Imported
chikungunya virus infection. Emerg. Infect. Dis. 2010, 16, 162. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
15. Reiter, P. Yellow fever and dengue: A threat to Europe? Eurosurveillance 2010, 15, 19509. [PubMed]
16. Almeida, A.P.; Gonçalves, Y.; Novo, M.; Sousa, C.; Melim, M.; Gracio, A.J. Vector monitoring of Aedes aegypti
in the Autonomous Region of Madeira, Portugal. Wkly. Releases (1997–2007) 2007, 12, 3311. [CrossRef]
[PubMed]
Trop. Med. Infect. Dis. 2019, 4, 101 15 of 18
17. Yunicheva, Y.; Ryabova, T.; Markovich, N.; Bezzhonova, O.; Ganushkina, L.; Semenov, V.; Tarkhov, G.;
Vasilenko, L.; Guzeeva, T.; Shevereva, T. First data on the presence of breeding populations of the Aedes
aegypti L. mosquito in Greater Sochi and various cities of Abkhazia. Meditsinskaia Parazitol. I Parazit. Bolezn.
2008, 3, 40–43.
18. Scholte, E.; Den Hartog, W.; Dik, M.; Schoelitsz, B.; Brooks, M.; Schaffner, F.; Foussadier, R.; Braks, M.;
Beeuwkes, J. Introduction and control of three invasive mosquito species in the Netherlands, July–October
2010. Eurosurveillance 2010, 15, 19710. [PubMed]
19. Trewin, B.J.; Darbro, J.M.; Jansen, C.C.; Schellhorn, N.A.; Zalucki, M.P.; Hurst, T.P.; Devine, G.J. The
elimination of the dengue vector, Aedes aegypti, from Brisbane, Australia: The role of surveillance, larval
habitat removal and policy. PLoS Negl. Trop. Dis. 2017, 11, e0005848. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
20. Schaffner, F.; Chouin, S.; Guilloteau, J. First record of Ochlerotatus (Finlaya) japonicus japonicus (Theobald,
1901) in metropolitan France. J. Am. Mosq. Control Assoc. 2003, 19, 1–5.
21. Snow, K.; Ramsdale, C. Mosquitoes and tyres. Biologist (Lond. Engl.) 2002, 49, 49–52.
22. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Aedes Albopictus—Current Known Distribution in
Europe, April 2017; ECDC: Solna, Sweden, 2017.
23. Reiter, P. Aedes albopictus and the world trade in used tires, 1988–1995: The shape of things to come? J. Am.
Mosq. Control Assoc. 1998, 14, 83–94. [PubMed]
24. Ayres, C.; Romao, T.; Melo-Santos, M.; Furtado, A. Genetic diversity in Brazilian populations of Aedes
albopictus. Mem. Do Inst. Oswaldo Cruz 2002, 97, 871–875. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
25. O’meara, G.F. The Asian Tiger Mosquito in Florida. Tallahassee City: University of Florida IFAS Extension
(EDIS). Available online: https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/mg339 (accessed on 5 February 2019).
26. Linthicum, K.J.; Kramer, V.L.; Madon, M.B.; Fujioka, K. Introduction and potential establishment of Aedes
albopictus in California in 2001. J. Am. Mosq. Control Assoc. 2003, 19, 301–308. [PubMed]
27. Halstead, S.B. Successes and failures in dengue control global experience. In Proceedings of the International
Conference on DF/DHF, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 20–24 November 2000.
28. Brown, J.E.; Scholte, E.-J.; Dik, M.; Den Hartog, W.; Beeuwkes, J.; Powell, J.R. Aedes aegypti mosquitoes
imported into the Netherlands, 2010. Emerg. Infect. Dis. 2011, 17, 2335. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
29. Chadee, D.; Connell, N.; Le Maitre, A.; Ferreira, S. Surveillance for Aedes aegypti in Tobago, West Indies
(1980-82). Mosq. News (USA) 1984, 44, 490–492.
30. Mayers, P. Recent introduction of Aedes aegypti in Bermuda. Mosq. News 1983, 43, 361–362.
31. Self, L. Vector Introductions Associated with Disease Outbreaks in the Western Pacific Region; WHO Regional
Office for South-East Asia: New Delhi, India, 1984.
32. Japan Meteorological Agency. Climate of Japan, General Information on Climate of Japan. 2019. Available
online: https://www.data.jma.go.jp/gmd/cpd/longfcst/en/tourist.html (accessed on 5 May 2019).
33. Kobayashi, M.; Nihei, N.; Kurihara, T. Analysis of northern distribution of Aedes albopictus (Diptera:
Culicidae) in Japan by geographical information system. J. Med. Entomol. 2002, 39, 4–11. [CrossRef]
34. Liu-Helmersson, J.; Quam, M.; Wilder-Smith, A.; Stenlund, H.; Ebi, K.; Massad, E.; Rocklöv, J. Climate
change and Aedes vectors: 21st century projections for dengue transmission in Europe. EBioMedicine 2016, 7,
267–277. [CrossRef]
35. Kobayashi, M.; Komagata, O.; Yonejima, M.; Maekawa, Y.; Hirabayashi, K.; Hayashi, T.; Nihei, N.; Yoshida, M.;
Tsuda, Y.; Sawabe, K. Retrospective search for dengue vector mosquito Aedes albopictus in areas visited by a
German traveler who contracted dengue in Japan. Int. J. Infect. Dis. 2014, 26, 135–137. [CrossRef]
36. Bliss, A.R., Jr.; Gill, J.M. The effects of freezing on the larvae of Aedes aegypti1. Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg. 1933,
1, 583–588. [CrossRef]
37. Chandler, A.C. Factors influencing the uneven distribution of Aedes aegypti in Texas Cities1. Am. J. Trop.
Med. Hyg. 1945, 1, 145–149. [CrossRef]
38. Hales, S.; De Wet, N.; Maindonald, J.; Woodward, A. Potential effect of population and climate changes on
global distribution of dengue fever: An empirical model. Lancet 2002, 360, 830–834. [CrossRef]
39. Derraik, J.G.; Slaney, D. Anthropogenic environmental change, mosquito-borne diseases and human health
in New Zealand. Ecohealth 2007, 4, 72–81. [CrossRef]
Trop. Med. Infect. Dis. 2019, 4, 101 16 of 18
40. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Global Warming of 1.5 ◦C: An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts
of Global Warming of 1.5 ◦C Above Pre-industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in
the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and
Efforts to Eradicate Poverty; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Geneva, Switzerland, 2018.
41. Lafferty, K.D. The ecology of climate change and infectious diseases. Ecology 2009, 90, 888–900. [CrossRef]
[PubMed]
42. Åström, C.; Rocklöv, J.; Hales, S.; Béguin, A.; Louis, V.; Sauerborn, R. Potential distribution of dengue
fever under scenarios of climate change and economic development. Ecohealth 2012, 9, 448–454. [CrossRef]
[PubMed]
43. Frampton, E. Pathways of Entry and Spread of Exotic Mosquitoes, with Particular Reference to Southern Saltmarsh
Mosquito, Ochlerotatus Camptorhynchus; Critique Limited: New Delhi, India, 2004.
44. New Zealand Biosecure Entomology Laboratory (NZBEL), SMS Ltd. New Zealand Mosquitoes. Available
online: https://www.smsl.co.nz/NZBEL/New+Zealand+Mosquitoes.html (accessed on 26 June 2019).
45. New Zealand BioSecure. Medical Vectors: An Education Guide for Border Health and Integrated Pest Management;
New Zealand BioSecure: Arrowtown, New Zealand, 2018.
46. Laird, M.; Calder, L.; Thornton, R.C.; Syme, R.; Holder, P.; Mogi, M. Japanese Aedes albopictus among four
mosquito species reaching New Zealand in used tires. J. Am. Mosq. Control Assoc. Mosq. News 1994, 10,
14–23.
47. Laird, M. Background and findings of the 1993–94 New Zealand mosquito survey. N. Z. Entomol. 1995, 18,
77–90. [CrossRef]
48. Derraik, J.G. Exotic mosquitoes in New Zealand: A review of species intercepted, their pathways and ports
of entry. Aust. N. Z. J. Public Health 2004, 28, 433–444. [CrossRef]
49. New Zealand Ministry of Health. Environmental Health Protection Manual Version 1.0. Section 5—Border Health
(Unpublished); New Zealand Ministry of Health: Thorndon, New Zealand, 2018.
50. The New Zealand Ministry of Health. Exotic Mosquitoes. Available online: https://www.health.govt.nz/
your-health/healthy-living/environmental-health/pests-and-insects/mosquitoes/exotic-mosquitoes (accessed
on 9 April 2019).
51. Hustedt, S. A Risk Analysis of New Zealand’s Biosecurity Management System along Three Sea Importation
Pathways. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 2010.
52. Stolwijk, A.; Straatman, H.; Zielhuis, G. Studying seasonality by using sine and cosine functions in regression
analysis. J. Epidemiol. Community Health 1999, 53, 235–238. [CrossRef]
53. Kay, B.; Russell, R. Mosquito Eradication: The Story of Killing Campto; CSIRO Publishing: Collingwood,
Australia, 2013.
54. Kamgang, B.; Brengues, C.; Fontenille, D.; Njiokou, F.; Simard, F.; Paupy, C. Genetic structure of the tiger
mosquito, Aedes albopictus, in Cameroon (Central Africa). PLoS ONE 2011, 6, e20257. [CrossRef]
55. Barrera, R.; Medialdea, V. Development time and resistance to starvation of mosquito larvae. J. Nat. Hist.
1996, 30, 447–458. [CrossRef]
56. Mori, A. Effects of larval density and nutrition on some attributes of immature and adult Aedes albopictus.
Trop. Med. 1979, 21, 85–103.
57. Villena, O.C.; Terry, I.; Iwata, K.; Landa, E.R.; LaDeau, S.L.; Leisnham, P.T. Effects of tire leachate on
the invasive mosquito Aedes albopictus and the native congener Aedes triseriatus. PeerJ 2017, 5, e3756.
[CrossRef] [PubMed]
58. Juliano, S.A.; O’Meara, G.F.; Morrill, J.R.; Cutwa, M.M. Desiccation and thermal tolerance of eggs and the
coexistence of competing mosquitoes. Oecologia 2002, 130, 458–469. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
59. Shipping Guides Ltd. The Ships Atlas, 7th ed.; Shipping Guides Ltd.: Reigate, UK, 1998.
60. MoveHub. Shipping Times and Costs from München (Munich), Germany to Auckland, New
Zealand. Available online: https://www.movehub.com/de/international-shipping/new-zealand/auckland-
from-muenchen-munich/ (accessed on 29 April 2019).
61. Biosecurity New Zealand. Ministry of agriculture and forestry Wellington New Zealand. In Import Risk
Analysis: Vehicle and Machinery; Biosecurity New Zealand: Wellington, New Zealand, 2007; p. 364.
62. Hien, D.S. Biology of Aedes aegypti (L., 1762) and Aedes albopictus (Skuse, 1895) (Diptera, Culicidae). III.
Effect of certain environmental conditions on the development of larvae and pupae. Acta Parasitol. Pol. 1975,
23, 553–568.
Trop. Med. Infect. Dis. 2019, 4, 101 17 of 18
63. Schmidt, T.L.; van Rooyen, A.R.; Chung, J.; Endersby-Harshman, N.M.; Griffin, P.C.; Sly, A.; Hoffmann, A.A.;
Weeks, A.R. Tracking genetic invasions: Genome-wide single nucleotide polymorphisms reveal the source of
pyrethroid-resistant Aedes aegypti (yellow fever mosquito) incursions at international ports. Evol. Appl.
2019, 12, 1136–1146. [CrossRef]
64. Auckland Internatinal Airport. Monthly Traffic Update—June 2018; Auckland Internatinal Airport: Auckland,
New Zealand, 2018.
65. Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE). International Airline Activity, Statistical
Report, BITRE, Canberra ACT; Australian Government, The Department of Infrastructure, Regional
Development and Cities: Canberra, Australia, 2018.
66. Crump, J.A.; Murdoch, D.R.; Baker, M.G. Emerging infectious diseases in an island ecosystem: The New
Zealand perspective. Emerg. Infect. Dis. 2001, 7, 767. [CrossRef]
67. Statistics New Zealand. New Zealand in Profile; Statistics New Zealand: Wellington, New Zealand, 2015.
68. The Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR). Notifiable Diseases in New Zealand: Annual Report
2016; The Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR): Wellington, New Zealand, 2017.
69. De Wet, N.; Ye, W.; Hales, S.; Warrick, R.; Woodward, A.; Weinstein, P. Use of a computer model to identify
potential hotspots for dengue fever in New Zealand. N. Z. Med. J. 2001, 114, 420. [PubMed]
70. Morrah, M. Thousands of NZ Cruise Ship Tourists Going Unchecked by MPI; Newshub: Wellington,
New Zealand, 2019.
71. Biosecurity New Zealand. Protection & Response: Culex Sitiens. Available online: https://www.mpi.govt.nz/
protection-and-response/responding/alerts/culex-sitiens/ (accessed on 12 April 2019).
72. Boyd, A.M.; Kay, B.H. Vector competence of Aedes aegypti, Culex sitiens, Culex annulirostris, and Culex
quinquefasciatus (Diptera: Culicidae) for Barmah Forest virus. J. Med. Entomol. 2000, 37, 660–663. [CrossRef]
[PubMed]
73. Ryan, S.J.; Carlson, C.J.; Mordecai, E.A.; Johnson, L.R. Global expansion and redistribution of Aedes-borne
virus transmission risk with climate change. PLoS Negl. Trop. Dis. 2019, 13, e0007213. [CrossRef]
74. National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA). Seasonal Climate Summary. Summer 2017–18.
New Zealand’s Hottest Summer on Record; National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA):
Auckland, New Zealand, 2018.
75. Pearce, P.; Bell, R.; Bostock, H.; Carey-Smith, T.; Collins, D.; Fedaeff, N.; Kachhara, A.; Macara, G.; Mullan, B.;
Paulik, R.; et al. Auckland Region Climate Change Projections and Impacts. Revised January 2018. Prepared by the
National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research, NIWA, for Auckland Council. Auckland Council Technical
Report; National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA): Auckland, New Zealand, 2018; p. 359.
76. Derraik, J.G. A scenario for invasion and dispersal of Aedes albopictus (Diptera: Culicidae) in New Zealand.
J. Med Entomol. 2006, 43, 1–8. [CrossRef]
77. Baker, M.G.; Easther, S.; Wilson, N. A surveillance sector review applied to infectious diseases at a country
level. BMC Public Health 2010, 10, 332. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
78. Werblow, A.; Flechl, E.; Klimpel, S.; Zittra, C.; Lebl, K.; Kieser, K.; Laciny, A.; Silbermayr, K.; Melaun, C.;
Fuehrer, H.P. Direct PCR of indigenous and invasive mosquito species: A time-and cost-effective technique
of mosquito barcoding. Med. Vet. Entomol. 2016, 30, 8–13. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
79. Montgomery, B.L.; Shivas, M.A.; Hall-Mendelin, S.; Edwards, J.; Hamilton, N.A.; Jansen, C.C.; McMahon, J.L.;
Warrilow, D.; van den Hurk, A.F. Rapid Surveillance for Vector Presence (RSVP): Development of a novel
system for detecting Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus. PLoS Negl. Trop. Dis. 2017, 11, e0005505.
[CrossRef] [PubMed]
80. Beebe, N.W.; Whelan, P.; van den Hurk, A.; Ritchie, S.A.; Cooper, R.D. Genetic diversity of the dengue vector
Aedes aegypti in Australia and implications for future surveillance and mainland incursion monitoring.
Commun. Dis. Intell. 2005, 29, 299–303.
Trop. Med. Infect. Dis. 2019, 4, 101 18 of 18
81. Honório, N.A.; Silva, W.d.C.; Leite, P.J.; Gonçalves, J.M.; Lounibos, L.P.; Lourenço-de-Oliveira, R. Dispersal
of Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus (Diptera: Culicidae) in an urban endemic dengue area in the State of
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Memórias Do Inst. Oswaldo Cruz 2003, 98, 191–198.
82. World Health Organization. Guidelines for Testing the Efficacy of Insecticide Products Used in Aircraft; WHO:
Geneva, Switzerland, 2012.
© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
